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A Road Not Taken: Economists, Historians of 
Science, and the Making of the Bowman Report 
Roger E. Backhouse, University of Birmingham and Erasmus University Rotterdam
Harro Maas, University of Lausanne
Abstract: This essay investigates a hitherto-unexamined collaboration between 
two of the founders of modern history of science, Henry Guerlac and I. Bernard 
Cohen, and two economists, Paul Samuelson and Rupert Maclaurin. The arena 
in which these two disciplines came together was the Bowman Committee, 
one of the committees that prepared material for Vannevar Bush’s Science—The 
Endless Frontier. The essay shows how their collaboration helped to shape the 
committee’s recommendations, in which different models of science confronted  
each other. It then shows how, despite this success, the basis for long-term col-
laboration of economists and historians of science disappeared, because the re-
sulting linear model of science and technology separated the study of scientific 
and economic progress into noncommunicating boxes . 
On 20 September 1944 Rupert Maclaurin, Professor of Economics at MIT, wrote to Henry Guerlac, the official historian of the Radiation Laboratory, about his future. 
I would like, therefore, to explore with you the possibilities of your ultimately joining our 
group here. . . . I am under the impression that you were planning to go back to Wiscon-
sin to finish out your term there, anyway, but my interest is of longer range than that. I 
believe that if you wanted to switch your field to history of modern science and engineer-
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ing there might be a very interesting career opportunity at M.I.T. In any event, wherever 
you are after the War, I would like to see now if we couldn’t work out some kind of coop-
erative plan for developing the field. I would like to see a setup which would attract some 
really able graduate students into the field and would include a live program of research 
in which the skills and background of the economist and the historian of science would 
be combined in some way or would at least benefit by cross fertilization of ideas.1
This long-term collaboration never happened: economics and the history of science developed 
largely independently after the war, with significant implications for the study of the linkages 
between science, technology, and economic change. Guerlac returned to Cornell, where he 
was instrumental in establishing its history of science program, while the economists at MIT 
developed approaches to innovation and economic growth that were not informed by history of 
science. Before their separation, however, a brief window of collaboration between economists 
and historians opened up when Maclaurin, Paul Samuelson, Guerlac, and I. Bernard Cohen 
came together in the first four months of 1945 to work on the Bowman Report.
On 21 November 1944, President Roosevelt asked Office of Scientific Research and Devel-
opment (OSRD) director Vannevar Bush to prepare a report on what the American government 
could do to support science after the war in order to ensure the long-term safety and prosperity 
of the American people.2 One element of Bush’s response was to invite the Johns Hopkins 
geographer Isaiah Bowman, a veteran of such work, to chair a committee that would prepare a 
report on the third of four questions posed in Roosevelt’s letter: “What can the government do 
now and in the future to aid research activities by public and private organizations?”3 Maclau-
rin was invited to act as the committee’s secretary. Samuelson was named assistant secretary, 
and Guerlac was appointed to head up the secretariat, which included Cohen as one of its 
members, that would undertake research and prepare materials for the committee.4
Despite the extensive literature on the Bush Report, the operation of the Bowman Com-
mittee, the arena in which our protagonists came together and in which different conceptions 
of science confronted each other, has not been analyzed. Historians have examined the role 
of this report in the political processes leading to the establishment of the National Science 
Foundation (NSF), the authorship of Roosevelt’s letter to Bush, and whether or not it affirmed 
the linear model of the relationship between science and economic growth.5 This literature on 
1 Rupert Maclaurin to Henry Guerlac, 20 Sept. 1944, Henry Guerlac Papers, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., Box 25, Folder 9 
(such references hereafter take the form HGP 25/9).
2 Vannevar Bush, Science—The Endless Frontier: A Report to the President (1945; Washington, D.C.: National Science Founda-
tion, 1960).
3 Roosevelt added the rider, “The proper roles of public and private research, and their interrelation, should be carefully consid-
ered”: quoted ibid., p. 73. Bowman had taken the initiative for the short-lived National Science Advisory Board, headed by MIT 
president Karl Compton. It had reported on the same question that was now under consideration. See Carroll W. Pursell, Jr., 
“The Anatomy of a Failure: The Science Advisory Board, 1933–1935,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 1965, 
109:342–351.
4 The secretariat also included the chemist John Edsall and Robert Morison, a biologist and Rockefeller Foundation officer. 
Remarkably, Samuelson’s later account mentioned only Edsall, Morison, and himself as writing the report. See Paul Samuelson, 
“Three Moles,” Bulletin of the American Academy, 2009, 58(2):83–89, esp. pp. 83–84. Papers relating to the Bowman Commit-
tee are archived with the OSRD Papers, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland. Guerlac kept 
copies of some of these papers, along with notes and minutes not found with the OSRD Papers, and these are now part of the 
Guerlac archives at Cornell.
5 On the Bush Report and the NSF see Daniel J. Kevles, “The National Science Foundation and the Debate over Postwar 
Research Policy, 1942–1945: A Political Interpretation of Science—The Endless Frontier,” Isis, 1977, 68:4–26; Michael A. Den-
nis, “Historiography of Science: An American Perspective,” in Science in the Twentieth Century, ed. John Krige and Domi-
nique Pestre (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 1997), pp. 1–26; Jessica Wang, “Liberals, the Progressive Left, and the Political 
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the origins of the report has to a large extent focused on Bush’s crafting of his text so as to con-
vey the desired message to his target audiences. The four committees whose reports he drew 
on are generally depicted as following Bush’s preconceived plans or bending to his wishes. For 
example, in his biography of Bush, G. Pascal Zachary opined that, with the exception of that 
on health research, the committees were made up of Bush’s friends, who were, by and large, 
already in agreement with his ideas or were willing to go along with them.6 This was not the 
case.7 Important features of the Bowman Report were determined by the scientists on the com-
mittee; many of them were indeed Bush’s friends and shared his views, but this did not prevent 
the secretariat, supported by some committee members, from pushing a different line. Even 
though the secretariat did not get exactly the report it wanted, the final document was not one 
that the committee would have produced if left to its own devices.
This essay reconstructs the deliberations of the Bowman Committee through the eyes of its 
secretariat to show how these young scholars—who, with the exception of Maclaurin, were to 
become stars in their respective disciplines—sought to reconcile competing perspectives on 
science policy. We then assess the consequences of their work, both for the Bowman Report 
and for what happened to the two disciplines afterward. First, however, we need to establish the 
main issues in play in discussions of science policy in the years leading up to the Bush Report 
and what our four protagonists brought to the table .
T H E  p o l i T i c S  o f  S c i E N c E  p o l i c y
Roosevelt’s question to Bush—how to safeguard the security and prosperity of the American 
public through science—has to be seen against general fears among policy makers and econo-
mists of a sustained period of stagnation due to a lack of industrial innovation and low popula-
tion growth. Clearly, the research and development departments of corporate America had 
contributed substantially to economic growth in the interwar period, but it was generally held 
that industrial innovation relied on discoveries made by scientists with university positions, 
even though high-profile scientists were increasingly hired by industrial laboratories.8 If in-
novation was sought through science, this raised important questions about its supporting in-
frastructure and about how to regulate the relations between science and industry. In addition, 
Economy of Postwar American Science: The National Science Foundation Debate Revisited,” Historical Studies in the Physical 
and Biological Sciences, 1995,  26:139–166; Wang, American Science in an Age of Anxiety: Scientists, Anticommunism, and 
the Cold War (Chapel Hill: Univ. North Carolina Press, 1999); and Johanna Bockman and Michael A. Bernstein, “Scientific 
Community in a Divided World: Economists, Planning, and Research Priority during the Cold War,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 2008, 50:581–613. On the authorship of Roosevelt’s letter see Kevles, “FDR’s Science Policy,” Science, 1974, 
183(4127):798–800; and G. Pascal Zachary, Endless Frontier: Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the American Century (New York: Free 
Press, 1997). On exclusion of the social sciences from the NSF see Mark Solovey, “Senator Fred Harris’s National Social Science 
Foundation Proposal: Reconsidering Federal Science Policy, Natural Science–Social Science Relations, and American Liberal-
ism during the 1960s,” Isis, 2012, 103:54–82; and Solovey, Shaky Foundations: The Politics–Patronage–Social Science Nexus in 
Cold War America (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 2013). On the Bush Report and the linear model of innovation 
see David Edgerton, “‘The Linear Model’ Did Not Exist: Reflections on the History and Historiography of Science and Research 
in Industry in the Twentieth Century,” in The Science–Industry Nexus: History, Policy, Implications, ed. Karl Grandin, Nina 
Wormbs, and Sven Widmalm (New York: Watson, 2004), pp. 31–57; and Benoit Godin, “The Linear Model of Innovation: The 
Historical Construction of an Analytical Framework,” Science, Technology, and Human Values, 2006, 31:639–667.
6 Zachary, Endless Frontier, p. 222.
7 Bush himself denied that he sought to control the committee, except on the matter of patents, which he reserved for himself. 
On 23 Mar. 1945 Bush wrote E. B. Wilson saying he left the committee’s work “practically entirely in their hands,” because “the 
formulations and studies and thoughts should come from them and not from me,” on the grounds that he had no time to “think 
through the broad matters that are involved”: Report to President, OSRD 4/Committee No. 4.
8 Michael Dennis, “Accounting for Research: New Histories of Corporate Laboratories and the Social History of American Sci-
ence,” Social Studies of Science, 1987, 17:479–518.
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the contributions of science to the Great War had raised doubts about science itself. When 
hostility to science waned in the 1930s, questioning the benefits of science morphed into ques-
tioning the merits of its independence from political control, the most notorious statement 
of this view being The Social Function of Science (1939), by J. D. Bernal, a British chemist and 
member of the Communist Party. This book asked why public money should support the private 
activities of scientists who were not subject to political control. Bernal aroused much opposition 
from scientists across the political spectrum, especially in view of the state interference in sci-
ence in the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. In 1940 the chemist Michael Polanyi and others 
established the Society for Freedom of Science in Britain to counter what they considered an 
embrace of totalitarian control of science. Robert Merton’s “A Note on Science and Democ-
racy,” in which he originally articulated the famous “scientific ethos,” echoed such concerns.9
Even before the appearance of Bernal’s book, and in response to the changing relations 
between science and industry, James Conant, president of Harvard, and Karl Compton, presi-
dent of MIT, each began to promote a different model of science. They both used Henry 
Rowland’s famous distinction between “pure” and “applied” science, which legitimized the 
scientist’s independence from practical goals, they both saw scientists as motivated primarily 
by curiosity about the world, and they both feared the consequences of political control—but 
they held contrasting views on the institutional context in which science was best undertaken.10 
Conant focused on the conditions that enabled the individual creative genius to flourish. Har-
vard created interstitial spaces, such as J. L. Henderson’s Fatigue Laboratory and the Society 
of Fellows, that allowed dissent and debate. Conant’s model was the Harvard scholar who, 
as Jamie Cohen-Cole recently put it, conversed in “a learning environment with ‘pleasant 
rooms’ and ‘comfortable chairs.’ ”11 In contrast, Compton’s interest was in the output side of 
the chain of discovery. Though he too embraced the rhetoric of creative genius, his model of 
the scientist was that of the laboratory researcher who worked on a long-run collaborative ex-
periment that inevitably needed the hand of an intelligent planner. Creative individuals could 
function very well in a planned environment. Compton’s model scientific setting resembled 
9 J. D. Bernal, The Social Function of Science (New York: Macmillan, 1939); and Robert Merton, “A Note on Science and De-
mocracy,” Journal of Legal and Political Sociology, 1942, 1:115–126. On opposition to Bernal’s book, including the formation of 
the Society for the Freedom of Science, see Mary Jo Nye, Michael Polanyi and His Generation: Origins of the Social Construction 
of Science (Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press, 2011). Polanyi would increasingly move to an interpretation of the scientific process 
that saw scientists coordinating as if guided by the invisible hand of the market, an interpretation congenial to Friedrich Hayek. 
In his Road to Serfdom (Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press, 1944), Hayek would similarly argue against state interference with sci-
ence. On resistance of American scientists against Senator Harley Kilgore’s proposals see the texts cited in note 5, above. On the 
different notions of planning see Marcia Balisciano, “Hope for America: American Notions of Economic Planning between Plu-
ralism and Neoclassicism, 1930–1950,” in From Interwar Pluralism to Postwar Neoclassicism, ed. Mary S. Morgan and Malcolm 
Rutherford (History of Political Economy, Suppl., 30) (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1998), pp. 153–178.
10 For nineteenth-century discussions of the distinction between “pure” and “applied” science see the Focus section “Applied 
Science,” Isis, 2012, 103(3). On Rowland’s distinction see esp. Paul Lucier, “The Origins of Pure and Applied Science in Gilded 
Age America,” ibid., pp. 527–536.
11 Jamie Cohen-Cole, “The Creative American: Cold War Salons, Social Science, and the Cure for Modern Society,” Isis, 2009, 
100:219–262, on p. 254. On the Harvard model promoted by Conant see Joel Isaac, Working Knowledge: Making the Human 
Sciences from Parsons to Kuhn (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2012); and Cohen-Cole, The Open Mind: Cold War Poli-
tics and the Sciences of Human Nature (Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press, 2014). For Conant’s remarks on the matter see James B. 
Conant, “President’s Address,” in The Tercentenary of Harvard College (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1937), p. 70 
(the address was delivered on 20 Mar. 1936); and Conant, “The Advancement of Learning in the United States in the Post-War 
World,” Proc. Amer. Phil. Soc., 1944, 87:291–298. On Conant’s vision regarding the role of a general science education (and on 
the relation of the history of science to the sciences) see Christopher Hamlin, “The Pedagogical Roots of the History of Science: 
Revisiting the Vision of James Bryant Conant,” Isis, 2016, 107:282–308. These very different accounts agree on Conant’s efforts 
to create the conditions to enhance the creativity of the individual scientist, as necessary for scientific progress.
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that of the industrial research laboratory, which had grown spectacularly in importance in the 
interwar period, and fits with his and Bush’s attempts to enhance the research profile of MIT 
by strengthening its bonds with government and industry.12 In line with this, Compton envi-
sioned an important role for the Industrial Relations Section within the recently established 
Department of Economics and Social Science in reaching an understanding of the chain 
from scientific discovery to new technologies and products. Patents were of central importance 
in organizing this chain.
The immediate context of the Bowman Committee’s discussions was the introduction, by 
Senator Harley Kilgore, of a series of bills to establish a national foundation in support of sci-
ence. Seeing the problem as the monopolistic behavior of large firms, he proposed measures to 
spread support across the country under a board comprising representatives of different interest 
groups and to make the fruits of science a national resource instead of privately patentable goods. 
His proposals were seen by the OSRD scientists Bush, Conant, and Compton as bureaucratic 
interference that would stifle research by limiting universities’ ability to set their own research 
agendas and to patent their research results.13 They were agreed on the need for federal science 
funding, but there was no agreement on the form that funding should take. The OSRD, with 
its large research laboratories, might have been acceptable in wartime, but there was no con-
sensus that a similar institution would work in peacetime. Moreover, if a government funding 
body were established, that raised the issue of political control and interference. Also canvassed 
was the idea of using the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to distribute funds, but that 
raised further issues. The problem was seemingly intractable. Inevitably, given that Kilgore 
was making concrete proposals that involved an unacceptable degree of political control, Bush 
“seized the opportunity” given by Roosevelt’s letter to articulate an appropriate response.14 
Kilgore thus became the bogeyman against which the committees formulated their reports . 
 T H E  S E c R E TA R i AT  M E M B E R S 
The Economists
All of our protagonists, like many of the scientists involved in the Bowman Committee, had 
strong links to Harvard and MIT. Apart from their availability at a time when many were 
12 See Christophe Lécuyer, “Patrons and a Plan,” in Becoming MIT: Moments of  Decision, ed. David Kaiser (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 2010), pp. 59–80; Lécuyer, “Academic Science and Technology in the Service of Industry: MIT Creates a ‘Permeable’ 
Engineering School,” American Economic Review, 1998, 88(2):28–33, esp. p. 31; and John W. Servos, “The Industrial Relations of 
Science: Chemical Engineering at MIT, 1900–1939,” Isis, 1980, 71:531–549. See also David Noble, America by Design: Science, 
Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism (New York: Knopf, 1977); Dennis, “Accounting for Research” (cit. n. 8); Henry 
Etzkowitz, MIT and the Rise of Entrepreneurial Science (New York: Routledge, 2002); and Steven Shapin, The Scientific Life: The 
Moral History of a Late Twentieth-Century Vocation (Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press, 2009), esp. Chs. 4 and 5. Etzkowitz investigates 
the model of an entrepreneurial university that, he argues, was conceived and developed by Bush and Compton. Noble’s book has 
served as an important reference for work that discredited the linear model that is commonly considered a result of the Bush Report.
13 On Kilgore’s initiatives see Robert Franklin Maddox, “The Politics of World War II Science: Senator Harley M. Kilgore and 
the Legislative Origins of the National Science Foundation,” West Virginia History, Fall 1979, 41:20–39. On the OSRD scien-
tists’ worries see Kevles, “National Science Foundation and the Debate over Postwar Research Policy” (cit. n. 5), p. 7; Wang, 
“Liberals, the Progressive Left, and the Political Economy of Postwar American Science” (cit. n. 5), p. 142; and Maddox, “Poli-
tics of World War II Science.” Kilgore’s proposals did not even enable his allies in the War Production Board to create a strong 
research arm within their own agency. See David M. Hart, Forged Consensus: Science, Technology, and Economic Policy in the 
United States, 1921–1953 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2010), p. 159. The stance of Thurman Arnold, Roosevelt’s 
chief “trust buster,” explained to a Congressional committee in 1943, was shared by Vice President Henry Wallace, who similarly 
held that patents were misused by the large firms that controlled research. See Kevles, “National Science Foundation and the 
Debate over Postwar Research Policy,” pp. 6–7.
14 Maddox, “Politics of World War II Science,” p. 31.
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serving in the armed forces, these men were obvious choices for the secretariat. Maclaurin, 
the son of former MIT President Richard C. Maclaurin and a family friend of Compton, had 
studied at Harvard with Joseph Schumpeter, famous for his theory that the process of capitalist 
development was driven by waves of innovation.15 As head of the Industrial Relations Section 
in MIT’s Department of Economics and Social Science, he had been conducting research, 
supported by Compton and funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, on the economics of tech-
nological change.16
Compton had repeatedly emphasized the connection between pure research and the pub-
lic good. Pure research, not driven by self-interest and uncertain in its results, had far-reaching 
consequences for a country’s prosperity. In his address “Science and Prosperity,” presented to 
the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Berkeley on 21 June 1934, he had 
quoted approvingly Faraday’s prediction that “electricity will pay taxes,” providing a rudimentary 
specification of the causalities of this connection: 
Most of the basic discoveries have been made by professors in educational institutes, 
spurred on to their investigations by insatiable scientific curiosity. Most of the rest has 
been done in industrial laboratories, especially recently, and governmental laborato-
ries have played an important rôle, especially in fixing standards of measurement. The 
industrial laboratories have taken the lead in developing useful applications of the dis-
coveries. Here and there have sprung up inventive geniuses. All this work has brought 
enormous returns to the public.17
Using electricity and the engineering arts to exemplify how investigations driven by curi-
osity ultimately raised the quality of life and provided employment to “millions of people,” 
Compton had emphasized that the trajectory from basic discovery to application could be 
much improved if properly understood. Comparing the American federal government with 
Maxwell’s famous demon, Compton argued that the former, “by intelligent operation of eco-
nomic and legislative controls,” could “bring order and power out of the chaos into which 
the country would necessarily drift” in its absence. Even if he agreed with Conant that funda-
mental breakthroughs in science were “almost impossible to plan,” this did not mean that the 
ensuing process to application could not be managed and controlled.18
Maclaurin’s project was to detail this process, thereby helping engineering students at MIT 
understand the institutional conditions necessary to turn light into fruit. He had outlined this 
vision at a session organized for the American Economic Association (AEA) in December 
1941. At that session, Roosevelt’s economic advisor, Lauchlin Currie, taking up an argument 
made by the Harvard economist Alvin Hansen before the war, had warned that the closing of 
the frontier and the resulting demographic transition made it necessary for the American econ-
omy to develop new industries. Other participants suggested that “many new openings could 
be developed if we spent a significant portion of our national income on scientific research 
15 The family lineage goes back to Colin Maclaurin, the eighteenth-century Scottish mathematician who became famous for 
his geometric rendering of Newton’s Principia. After Richard Maclaurin’s premature death, Compton, Jerome Hunsaker, and 
E. B. Wilson took care of his family.
16 See Roger E. Backhouse and Harro Maas, “Marginalizing Maclaurin: The Attempt to Develop an Economics of Technologi-
cal Progress at MIT, 1940–1950,” History of Political Economy, 2016, 48:423–447. Compton’s interest in setting up a program 
that would combine research and education in the process of innovation fit with David Hart’s larger story treating the context of 
American science and technology policy; see Hart, Forged Consensus (cit. n. 13).
17 Karl T. Compton, “Science and Prosperity,” Science, 1934, 80(2079):387–394, on p. 389.
18 James B. Conant, “Role of Science in Our Unique Society,” Science, 23 Jan. 1948, N.S., 107(2769): 77–83, on p. 80.
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and the training of scientists.” Maclaurin concluded that “it was agreed that considerably more 
basic research was needed,” for which industry was unlike to pay the bill. To enhance basic 
research, the federal government would have to step in.19 He understood planning in terms of 
generic government support of fundamental research rather than targeted support for specific 
projects or sectors of industry. Clearly, federal support for fundamental research at industrial 
laboratories was out of the question if industry alone would reap the benefits from patents 
funded with public money.
Concerns about the public organization of scientific research were also prominent in Sam-
uelson’s thinking on the role of science in a nation’s prosperity. Samuelson was a young math-
ematical economist that MIT had recently recruited from Harvard, where he had overlapped 
with Guerlac at the Society of Fellows. He had initially participated in Maclaurin’s project and 
acted as a consultant for the discontinued National Resources Planning Board, where he stud-
ied the economy’s prospects after the war, but by 1944 he was working as a mathematician in 
the Radiation Laboratory. Earlier that year, he took an active interest in the committee chaired 
by the president of General Electric (GE), Charles Wilson, to report on the funding of military 
research after the war. In a letter to a contact at the National Planning Association that clearly 
reflected discussions inside the Radiation Laboratory, Samuelson expressed concern that the 
Wilson Committee might come up with a proposal that was too modest. Samuelson believed 
that science needed greater organization than the scientists on the committee, who prioritized 
freedom from government interference, were prepared to admit. He ended up expressing his 
view in an unsigned editorial in the New Republic: “A good many well known scientists . . . take 
their coloration from the conservative business men who are their associates, and seem terribly 
alarmed lest government aid to scientific research should interfere with the sacred fetish of 
‘private enterprise.’ There is a real danger that they may cripple scientific research by turning 
it over to the same auspices which helped bring us to such a perilous condition in 1941.”20
A temporary board, of the sort suggested by the Wilson Committee, with members appointed 
by the National Academy of Sciences, was like suggesting “that the carpenters’ union should 
elect members of a board which is to plan public works.” Science was a public good and, para-
phrasing Clemenceau, “too important to be left to scientists.” If scientists did not come up with 
an adequate program because they were scared it might lead to unwelcome government inter-
ference, there was the danger that others who did not properly understand the nexus between 
science and industry (presumably he had Kilgore in mind) might do so, with detrimental 
results. For Samuelson, the main issue was not to preserve individual freedom as a necessary 
condition for fundamental research but, rather, to acknowledge the relation between planned 
military research and its spin-offs in the economy at large: “military research should be simply 
the opening wedge in a forward program of encouraging technical progress.” Drawing on his 
own experience at the Radiation Laboratory, he claimed that “centralized research in OSRD 
laboratories” was much more effective than research funded by federal grants-in-aid to univer-
sities. Managed science could be successful. When challenged that the government should not 
operate its own laboratories, instead contracting research to existing organizations, Samuelson 
19 W. Rupert Maclaurin, “Economics of Industrial Research,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 1942, 32(1[2]):231–232, on p. 232. See also 
Alvin H. Hansen, “Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth,” ibid., 1939, 29(1):1–15.
20 Paul Samuelson to John Coil, 6 Aug. 1944, Paul A. Samuelson Papers, Rubenstein Library, Duke University, Durham, N.C., 
Box 19, Folder C(1941–51) (hereafter abbreviated as PASP 19/C[1941–51]); and [Paul A. Samuelson,] “Science and the Na-
tional Defense,” New Republic, 1 Jan. 1945, pp. 7–8. On Samuelson more generally see Harro Maas, “Making Things Technical: 
Samuelson at MIT,” Hist. Polit. Econ., 2014, 46(Suppl.):272–294; and Roger E. Backhouse, “Paul Samuelson’s Move to MIT,” 
ibid., pp. 60–77. See also Backhouse, Founder of Modern Economics: An Intellectual Biography of Paul A. Samuelson, Vol. 1: 
Becoming Samuelson, 1915–48 (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2017).
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responded that the Radiation Laboratory’s being at MIT was “a mere formality.” It “has little to 
do with M.I.T. and it is the OSRD.” He continued, “Ask any producing scientist whether grants 
in aid to the Applied Mathematics Panel or to, say, the Radio Research Laboratory at Harvard 
are more productive. He is sure to select the latter and this is always the case.”21
Shortly after Samuelson had raised the issue of the Wilson Committee giving away too 
much to private enterprise, Maclaurin told Guerlac that he had had “a number of discussions 
recently with Dr. Jewett and Dr. Compton concerning the post-war organization of science in 
this country.” In consultation with Compton and probably with Samuelson, Maclaurin drafted 
a proposal to investigate the claim that universities were important for fundamental research. 
His memorandum proposed a survey of research programs in the natural sciences and engi-
neering that were carried out at premier American universities before the war. Echoing Comp-
ton’s remarks on the relation between science and economic growth and comments by men 
of business at his own AEA session, it claimed that fundamental research was of prime impor-
tance “to advance the higher standards of living” in the United States, for the creation of new 
investment opportunities, and for the development of new products. There were, however, 
important reasons to fear that fundamental research at universities had come under pressure 
in the prewar era because of lowered income flows from university endowments and decreased 
bequests from individuals. Even though new funds had been found through collaboration with 
industry—with the additional “healthy effect” that scientists were forced to pay closer attention 
to “actual industrial problems” and the achievement of “practical results”—this could have 
come at the cost of fundamental research.22
The sting came in the second part of the proposal. It was not clear that universities were 
using their funds efficiently, and there was, to date, no assessment showing that universities did 
in fact support the “long range” programs in which they claimed a “comparative advantage” 
over industry. Neither was there any assessment of “the nature and adequacy of [the universi-
ties’] total research contributions in different fields.” The memorandum outlined a survey of 
major university research centers, focusing on the adequacy of their teaching and (long-term) 
research programs in the natural and life sciences and engineering, in order to determine 
the “nature of the university research problem in its relation to future industrial needs” and 
possible remedial action.23 The similarities between these questions and those that would be 
tackled by the Bowman Committee are striking.
The Historians
We have seen that for the economists the emphasis was not on the freedom of the individual 
scientist to pursue his or her own curiosity, the issue that was central to the different visions of 
the relationship between science and the state that was brought to the secretariat by Guerlac 
and Cohen.24 They had come to know one another in the late 1930s through taking classes 
on the history of science in the Renaissance with the Italian émigré scholar Giorgio Diaz de 
Santillana, then a visiting lecturer at Harvard. Cohen, taken by Santillana’s ideas about the 
21 [Samuelson,] “Science and the National Defense,” p. 8; and Samuelson to Bruce Bliven, 30 Nov. 1944, PASP (New Republic) 
(emphasis in the original). The Radio Research Laboratory (RRL) was a spin-off from MIT’s Radiation Laboratory. Samuelson 
wrongly seems to imply that the Applied Mathematics Panel did not fall under the OSRD. On the RRL see Roger L. Geiger, Re-
search and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities since World War II (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993). On the 
effectiveness of OSRD research see Larry Owens, “The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: 
Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development,” Business History Review, 1994, 68:515–576.
22 Maclaurin to Guerlac, 20 Sept. 1944, HGP 25/9; and “Memorandum,” HGP 25/9.
23 “Sample accompanying letter” and “Memorandum,” HGP 25/9.
24 Dennis, “Historiography of Science” (cit. n. 5), discusses the different attitudes of Cohen and Guerlac to history.
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perpetual brotherhood of scientists that could thrive only when they were granted freedom of 
thought, had been the first to enroll in the history of science graduate program supported by 
Conant.25 He used historical case studies to teach students what Conant would later call the 
unchanging “tactics and strategies” of science. In 1941 he took on the task of writing a primer 
in the history of science that was commissioned by the NAS to promote its newly established 
private fundraising program, the National Science Fund, by convincing the general public of 
the benefits of science. This was eventually published as Science: Servant of Man (1949). Co-
hen sought to reclaim science’s independence and neutrality, challenged by arguments about 
the relations between science and war, by arguing that what mattered was “pure science”—
even when the distinction between pure and applied was gradual and not clear-cut. He agreed 
with Conant that real progress in science—genuine breakthroughs—could be made only if 
the scientist was not forced to think about practical applications of his work—that is, when he 
was free to determine his own research agenda. Cohen could therefore only “sigh” at science 
writers such as J. B. S. Haldane and Bernal, who maintained that scientists could not expect to 
be paid “merely to amuse themselves.” The “glorious pages of the history of science” showed 
that pure science—the unplanned research activities of the bright and curious—would eventu-
ally bear fruit in useful inventions.26 This was also the message of a book-length manuscript, 
“American Science and War,” on which Cohen had been working with a student of Robert 
Merton, Bernard Barber, in the early 1940s.27 Work on this manuscript would strain relations 
with Guerlac, whose thesis was precisely about the interrelations between war and science and 
who came to know about Cohen and Barber’s investigations only when Cohen asked for clari-
fications on the involvement of French engineers in the American War of Independence.28 
The outline of its contents showed the authors’ concern with the flurry of publications before 
the war, by Bernal, Haldane, Merton, and others, that problematized the social function of 
science in a modern society, especially scientists’ claims for freedom and independence from 
political control. 
Guerlac’s interests turned to history of science while he was a Junior Fellow at Harvard, 
from 1935 to 1938. In his thesis, “Science and War in the Old Regime: The Development 
of Science in an Armed Society,” submitted in 1941, on the establishment of the École de 
Mésières and the education of the French corps of engineers, Guerlac analyzed the historically 
intricate relations between science, war, and the state in an era in which war was considered 
an inevitable part of everyday life. Referring to the work of Leonardo, Stevin, Galileo, and 
earlier writers on engineering problems, he argued that the link between science and warfare 
25 For this history see I. B. Cohen Papers, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., Box 3, Folder: History of Science at Harvard, 
undated; and Cohen, “A Harvard Education,” Isis, 1984, 75:13–21.
26 I. B. Cohen, Science: Servant of Man (London: Sigma, 1949), p. 312 (quoting Bernal). See Dennis, “Historiography of Sci-
ence” (cit. n. 5), p. 9, for details on the project.
27 A manuscript of that proposed book, dedicated to George Sarton, circulated in 1942 among a Washington audience. Cohen 
later published parts of it. See I. B. Cohen, “Science and the Revolution,” Technology Review, 1945, 47:367–368, 374–378; 
“Science and the Civil War,” ibid., 1946, 48:167–170, 192–193; “American Physicists at War: From the Revolution to the World 
Wars,” American Journal of Physics, 1945, 13:223–235; and “American Physicists at War: From the First World War to 1942,” 
ibid., pp. 333–346. Bernard Barber published his own sociologically informed Science and the Social Order (New York: Free 
Press) in 1952; we have used the 1953 British edition.
28 This is clear from a furious letter from Guerlac to Cohen: “But then you have the audacity, not only to tackle a general job on 
the science and war business, on which notably I have been doing a certain amount of work, and do it collaboratively without 
even mentioning it to me, let alone asking me to participate (which again is your privilege), but you have the indescribable 
toupée to ask me to let you pillage my thesis for background material. What a nerve!” Cohen quoting Guerlac in an appeasing 
reply dated “Friday night,” Nov. 1941, HGP 25/23–24. Cohen destroyed his copy of Guerlac’s letter.
This content downloaded from 131.211.208.019 on March 18, 2017 05:38:06 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Isis—Volume 108, Number 1, March 2017   91
had deep roots. For example, he thought it no exaggeration to consider Galileo’s Dialogues 
concerning Two New Sciences (1638), a landmark in the so-called scientific revolution, a work 
on warfare: “The purpose of the treatise is revealed when, in the last section, he applies his 
carefully developed laws of motion to the study of projectiles.”29
Guerlac noted approvingly how writers such as Lancelot Hogben, Joseph Needham, Mer-
ton, and Bernal had started to approach their subject “with interpretive purpose, a sociologi-
cal curiosity, and the resolve to explore the religious, social and economic forces which have 
influenced the rise of science.” This literature was important in that it signaled “the need for 
a broad sociological and historical approach to the problem of the development of science.” 
He contended that Bernal’s “ambitious survey” of the social function of science had presented 
“for the first time . . . a realistic attitude towards science and war.” The reason this “realistic 
attitude” was not more widely held was that “under the spell of the Idea of Progress,” which 
Guerlac attributed to the “relatively peaceful” nineteenth century, science had come to be 
seen to promise “the elimination of war and the creation of the perfect society.” Even after the 
devastations of the Great War of 1914–1918, the idea of science’s beneficial progress quickly 
caught on again—even though, as Guerlac showed through looking at the case of France, “the 
tradition of military engineering in Western Europe is centrally important for the history of the 
interaction of science and war.”30
On these issues Guerlac had come to conclusions that differed dramatically from Cohen’s. 
His main thesis concerned the intricate relations between scientific progress, state planning, 
and war in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France. In contrast to the received view, cher-
ished by Cohen and Conant, of the Enlightenment as having established scientists’ indepen-
dence from the state, Guerlac showed how the organization of science in France under 
Colbert became a closely administered process, from which emerged large collaborative war-
related projects, such as Cassini’s famous map of France and Lavoisier’s régie des poudres et 
salpêtres.31 Guerlac followed the centralized organization of science in France through its 
publication practices and the educational reform of its engineering schools, especially the 
École de Mézières, the predecessor of the École Polytechnique. Science was planned and war 
related, and scientists—even in the Age of Enlightenment—had no problem taking part in 
such collaborative, planned, and highly consequential research programs. They were creative 
in the service of the state.
In an undated and unsigned lecture he must have delivered around or after Conant’s Frank-
lin Medal Lecture of 1943, in which Conant used the example of Nazi science to justify the 
need to keep science free from government interference, Guerlac examined the sea change 
that had taken place in American science between the creation of the NAS in 1916 and Amer-
ica’s involvement in World War II. Exploiting Conant’s painful comparison of American sci-
ence with that of Nazi Germany, Guerlac explained how American scientists had de facto 
29 Henry Guerlac, “Science and War in the Old Regime: The Development of Science in an Armed Society” (Ph.D. diss., 
Harvard Univ., 1941), p. 61. Guerlac chose to write a thesis in European history “to see if I could meet the standards of a regu-
larly established field” and because he thought the Department of History would provide better technical and methodological 
training. Guerlac to Edward Mead Earle, 20 Oct. 1952, HGP 26/11–12. A third reason was that he believed Sarton to be too 
busy to give much time to graduate students. See also Marie Boas Hall, “Eloge: Henry Guerlac, 10 June 1910–29 May 1985,” 
Isis, 1985, 77:504–506.
30 Guerlac, “Science and War in the Old Regime,” pp. i–ii, vi, iii–iv, 2. Barber’s Science and the Social Order (cit. n. 27) would 
contribute to the literature reflecting the need for a sociological and historical approach.
31 On Lavoisier’s régie des poudres see Patrice Bret, “Lavoisier à la régie des poudres: Le savant, le financier, l’administrateur et 
le pédagogue,” 1994, halshs-00002883.
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been “marshalled and mobilized to help fight this war” and how, under the pressure of cir-
cumstances, the organization of science had moved in the same direction as in Nazi Germany, 
where there had been a shift from (state-funded) theoretical research toward research into 
practical problems that could find application in the near future. Thus the Nazis developed 
research programs that were “rigidly controlled” and “subject to a highly centralized supervi-
sion.” It would be wrong, however, to conclude from this that Nazi Germany held science 
in low esteem. Implicitly referring to Conant, Guerlac contended that, though Americans 
“cried out” at what they saw as Nazi betrayal of the values of science, it would not take long for 
American science to reorganize itself in similar fashion. This reorganization would not be easy, 
for—and here Guerlac agreed with Barber and Cohen—America had no tradition of planned 
science, decentralization being “invariably the rule.”32 However, after the start made during 
Roosevelt’s New Deal, science was ready to mobilize by 1940—even before America had been 
drawn into the war. 
In June 1940 Roosevelt created the National Defense Research Council (NDRC)—headed 
by a strong opponent of peacetime planning of science, Conant—which “farmed” contract 
research to research centers, “much as production contracts are let to various industries.” The 
traditional distinction, if it ever existed, between research in universities and research in gov-
ernment and industrial laboratories had vanished. Science was being organized and planned 
in collaborative efforts of groups of scientists for specific purposes, rather than being dependent 
on the independent mind of the independent scholar. The organization of science increased 
further with the creation of the OSRD, headed by Bush. Guerlac’s additional message was 
that, well before Pearl Harbor, the wartime organization had betrayed the alleged open culture 
cherished by the proponents of free science by beginning to function in a climate of secrecy. 
Possibly referring to his inside knowledge of the Los Alamos project, acquired during his work 
as the Radiation Laboratory’s official historian, Guerlac closed by saying that just enough was 
known about the achievements of organized science “to prove that great things are in store for 
the Axis.”33
Guerlac, therefore, considered it a mistake to see the OSRD as the exception instead of the 
rule: the wartime experience should radically change thinking about the postwar organization 
of science in America. The difference between those who took this position, which Guerlac 
shared with Samuelson, and those who stressed the need for scientists to be free of any con-
straints on where their curiosity might lead was to be a major preoccupation of the Bowman 
Committee.
T H E  S E c R E TA R i AT  A N d  T H E  c o M M i T T E E
The operation of the committee
In addition to its chairman and secretary, the Bowman Committee numbered fifteen. There 
were two physicists: Vice Chairman John Tate and Isaac Isidor Rabi, heavily involved in the 
Manhattan Project and winner of the 1944 Nobel Prize for Physics. Industry was strongly rep-
resented—for example, by Oliver Buckley of Bell Telephone Laboratories and Edwin Land of 
Polaroid. Also involved were Warren Weaver from the Rockefeller Foundation, William Wrather 
from the U.S. Geological Survey, several university administrators, a former White House lawyer, 
and the economist Harold Moulton, president of the Brookings Institution.
32 Undated and unsigned lecture with notes and corrections in Guerlac’s longhand, HGP Box 25/3. For Conant’s Franklin 
Medal Lecture see Conant, “Advancement of Learning in the United States in the Post-War World” (cit. n. 11).
33 Undated and unsigned lecture with notes and corrections in Guerlac’s longhand, HGP Box 25/3.
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Much of the work was done by a steering committee, the main committee meeting only 
twice. At its first meeting, on 26 December 1944, the steering committee, comprising Bow-
man, Tate, Maclaurin, Buckley, Rabi, and Weaver, broke the president’s question into three: 
What should government do to encourage fundamental research in natural science and engi-
neering in universities? What research should government do itself ? What should government 
do to stimulate research in private industry? They took for granted Compton’s claim that “a 
study of the history of scientific development” clearly indicated “that many important new 
industries have had their origins in fundamental research” by individual scientists at universi-
ties. However, the distinction between fundamental and applied research was disputed, as 
was the question of whether fundamental research was best undertaken at universities or in 
government-financed laboratories.34
Samuelson, presumably in consultation with Maclaurin, set the agenda for the second 
meeting of the steering committee, on 3 January 1945, which discussed a memorandum he 
had prepared. It was decided that subcommittees, listed in Table 1, would prepare reports 
on different parts of the problem, which a working group would then combine into a draft 
report to be considered by the whole committee. Though the full committee met on 13 Janu-
ary, Samuelson’s memorandum had come close to defining the topics that the subcommittees 
would work on.35
Committee members contributed working documents to these subcommittees and were 
assisted by members of the secretariat and external experts. For example, Maclaurin’s subcom-
mittee, investigating the economic relationships between scientific research and industrial de-
velopment, turned to the Harvard economist Wassily Leontief. It is not known which members 
of the secretariat participated in the subcommittee meetings, but the minutes indicate that 
Guerlac and possibly Samuelson were present at several of them. Cohen was consulted by 
34 Minutes of committee meeting, 18 Jan. 1945, HGP 25/10.
35 Untitled typescript, 1 Jan. 1945, HGP 25/6. Samuelson’s name is handwritten with the date at the end of the document.
Table 1. Subcommittees and Chair
1.  Government assistance for research in universities and nonprofit research 
institutions
Rabi
2.  Government assistance to government research Wrather
3.  Government assistance to research in industry MacQuigg
4.  Tax stimuli to industrial research Dewey
5.  Change of patent system (See below)
6.  Economic relationships between scientific research and industrial development Maclaurin
7.  Proper roles of public and private research Wrather
8.  Instrumentality problem Cox
9.  Government policy to further international exchange of science and engineering 
knowledge
Haskins
Adapted from HGP 25/6-11, pp. 3–4. The table shows nine subcommittees, of which Subcommittee 5 
de facto consisted only of Bush. He wrote a memorandum for the Bowman Committee that was, 
not to his discontent, only marginally integrated in the final report. There were some so-called 
additional problems identified that were not assigned to specific committees, to which the secretariat 
predominantly contributed.
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Guerlac, especially on the history of science in America, but he did not remember having 
been present in any of the meetings.36 He assisted Rabi in a survey of prewar research activities 
in universities and collaborated with the chemist John Edsall and Leontief on an assessment 
of the organization of science in Europe. Guerlac wrote a memorandum on earlier proposals 
to support science in which he did not conceal his enthusiasm for the recommendations of 
Compton’s Science Advisory Board of 1933–1935. Bush considered the issue of patents too 
important to entrust to others and kept this for himself.
A draft report was discussed at the second meeting of the full committee on 26–27 March. 
Between that meeting and the second week of April, drafts went back and forth between the 
secretariat and Bush’s secretary Carroll Wilson and between committee members, who wrote 
memoranda on specific issues (see Figure 1). A revised draft was sent to Bush and members 
of the full committee on 20 April, and then, after further revisions, a final version was sent to 
Bush on 9 May.37
The issues at Stake
Terminology was clearly important, for it echoed conflicting views on what sort of research was 
in need of government support, the appropriate institutional setup, and whether certain types 
of research could be planned. At its first meeting, the steering committee considered the no-
tion of “fundamental” science, which was directed at the discovery and understanding of “new 
properties and attributes of nature.” However, it quickly settled on the distinction between 
“pure” and “applied,” where “pure” also entailed the freedom of the individual scientist to 
pursue his own interests, resisting the guiding hand of state or industry. A suggestion, possibly 
by Samuelson, that Guerlac would be a good person to define the distinction between the pure 
and the applied was not taken up, even though it was agreed that the secretariat would prepare 
a memorandum and search for additional documentation and data on the “pure science prob-
lem.” Instead, Weaver and Rabi each prepared a memorandum on pure science, while Buckley 
prepared notes on applied research. Weaver’s distinction between the pure and the applied 
would make it to the final report, though the document occasionally referred to “fundamental” 
and “basic” research as well, reflecting the lack of agreement within the committee and the 
secretariat. When a committee member criticized the distinction between pure and applied 
science in the penultimate draft report, Guerlac explained in a letter copied to Samuelson that 
unfortunately, apart from minor tweaking of the text, little could be done because the steering 
committee “had already pronounced ex cathedra on terms and definitions.”38
Even though the pure/applied distinction was non-negotiable, it was modified in the final 
report by the addition of a third category, that of “background” research: standardization, geo-
logical maps, meteorological data, physical and chemical constants. The matter of background 
36 J. Cole, D. E. Stokes, I. B. Cohen, and G. Holton, Science, The Endless Frontier, 1945–1995: Learning from the Past, Design-
ing for the Future, 1994, http://cpt.phys.utk.edu/~th/Physics490/VBushConference/complete94.pdf. Cohen figured on Guer-
lac’s list of people to speak to for his memorandum on earlier science policy initiatives: handwritten notes, HGP 25/5.
37 It cannot be established unambiguously who wrote which part of the final report. Samuelson remembered writing most of 
the report together with Edsall and Morison: Samuelson, “Three Moles” (cit. n. 4), p. 83. Guerlac wrote in 1952 that he and 
Samuelson had written most of the draft: Guerlac to Earle, 20 Oct. 1952, HGP 26/11–12. In the early 1990s Cohen remembered 
having written sections on the history of science in France and the United Kingdom and the history of science in the United 
States: Cole et al., Science—The Endless Frontier, 1945–1995: Learning from the Past, Designing for the Future (cit. n. 36), p. 22. 
The Guerlac Papers contain several drafts and memoranda in Guerlac’s longhand, covering the history of science in the United 
States and Europe, earlier committees that had advised on government support for science, and parts of the report of Subcom-
mittee 1, but we cannot unambiguously conclude that the text was his.
38 Detailed minutes of meeting, Steering Committee, 3 Jan. 1945, HGP 25/9, p. 6 (“background” research); and Guerlac to 
William R. Rubey, 5 Apr. 1945, HGP 25/3.
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research was raised, understandably, in the subcommittee chaired by Wrather, of the U.S. 
Geological Survey.39 Such research is fundamental and is not likely to be funded by indus-
39 Bush, Science—The Endless Frontier (cit. n. 2), p. 82; and Report of Subcommittee 7, 6 Mar. 1945, HGP 25/10.
Figure 1. Fragment of the draft content list, undated, probably early March 1945. Source: “Provi-
sional outline of final report,” HGP 25/6. The outline shows how the reports of the subcommittees 
of the Bowman report contributed to the report and, for some sections, if they were the responsibility 
of Guerlac (H.E.G.) or Maclaurin (W.R.M.). Courtesy Cornell University.
This content downloaded from 131.211.208.019 on March 18, 2017 05:38:06 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
96  Roger E. Backhouse and Harro Maas A Road Not Taken
try, but it has a practical objective; equally important, because it lies in the public domain, 
the government was well placed to handle it. Background research consisted of long-term 
projects, usually involving large teams and requiring complex planning and administration.40 
A note in Guerlac’s hand gave the example of studies in heredity, which would need long-term 
collaboration between statisticians and geneticists and careful planning to get to any meaning-
ful results.41
The committee argued that universities provided the preferred “historically acquired” “hab-
itat” for pure research. The corollary of this institutional and conceptual focus was that postwar 
support for fundamental research would increasingly go to (private) universities, strengthening 
their position against governmental and industrial research laboratories and showing the im-
portance of a reconsideration of patent regulation. 
Referring extensively to Conant’s Franklin Medal Lecture, Subcommittee 1 agreed that al-
though some types of scientific activity required planning, pure research, inherently “unpredict-
able,” did not, implying that support should be “flexible.” Just as the scholar was motivated by 
neither “financial reward” nor “the love of practical accomplishment,” so the scientist was driven 
by a “complex of motives,” including “a curiosity which leads from the better known to the lesser 
known.” They quoted Conant approvingly: “The scholar must be free. . . . He must inquire and 
speculate with as few restraints as possible.” Because pure research also required “its followers” to 
look at “familiar facts from unfamiliar viewpoints,” there were many scientists (the text mentioned 
Pasteur) whose ideas had met with strong resistance.42 The alignment of pure science with free 
inquiry made it almost impossible to conceive of a role for the state other than as a patron to pri-
vate universities, enabling scientists—and universities—to pursue their own preconceived goals.
Haldane’s and Bernal’s prewar questions about taxpayers’ money targeted exactly this issue 
and were echoed by Rabi in one of the first meetings of the steering committee. Rabi expressed 
his concerns about the likely recommendation of the committee to seek sustained funding 
of pure research in private universities. This was highly unusual and politically sensitive; 
moreover, he noted, even “under optimal conditions” university spending had been far from 
efficient. He challenged the need for unrestrained scientific freedom, claiming that “at least 
75 percent” of the six hundred people working in the Radiation Laboratory “would like to stay 
on in a similar setting after the war. These men have learned the value of adequate financial 
support and the intellectual pleasures of working together.” Working as a team on a project did 
not mean working under “centralized” or “government dictation.”43
40 “Ch. IV: Scientific Research in the Government Service,” HGP 25/6, p. 8. Parts of this manuscript are in Guerlac’s longhand. 
See also Bush, Science—The Endless Frontier, p. 99.
41 Handwritten note, “Kinds of research which may need govt support to permit them to develop,” undated and unsigned, 
HGP 25/6.
42 “Report of subcommittee no. 1, March 13, 1945,” HGP 25/10; there are quotations from and implicit references to Conant, 
“Advancement of Learning in the United States in the Post-War World” (cit. n. 11). Important parts of this report remained 
unchanged from their first appearance in the preamble, possibly drafted by Weaver or Rabi, on 13 Jan. 1945; see Minutes of 
committee meeting, 18 Jan. 1945, HGP 25/10. Significantly, an earlier version of this report shows a question mark in the 
margin in Guerlac’s hand. Conceiving of Pasteur’s work in terms of the pure scientist searching for nature’s hidden secrets 
was difficult to square with his own analysis of the entanglements between science and the state, in which teamwork and the 
state planning of research played such an important role. Guerlac’s question mark can be found in a draft for Subcommittee 1, 
entitled “Government Assistance to Universities and non-profit research institutes,” 5 Feb. 1945, HGP 25/8. The question mark 
did not lead to a change of text in the March report submitted to the full committee. Cohen used the case of Pasteur to argue 
for the importance of “happy accidents,” unplanned fundamental breakthroughs, in his science primer. The image of Pasteur 
as pursuing “pure science” became obsolete, of course, after Bruno Latour’s The Pasteurization of France (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1993).
43 Subcommittee draft, “The Federal government’s role in post-war scientific research,” 16 Feb. 1945, HGP 25/8, pp. 5, 10; and 
“Minutes of the meeting of the Bowman Committee held on March 26–7, 1945,” HGP 25/1–2, p. 6.
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Not only did some committee members not accept that decisions about university spending 
on pure research were best left to the universities, but the idea had also been challenged by 
Samuelson, Guerlac, and Maclaurin. In an undated note Guerlac reiterated his conviction that 
it was a mistake to locate pure research only in the universities, for Bush’s OSRD had unmistak-
ably changed the prewar scientific landscape by attracting the best and the finest, immigrants 
as well as American citizens, into a collaborative and long-term research effort. The committee 
“would be deceiving” itself if it ignored wartime experience and the fact that the OSRD was 
“perhaps the most representative,” “if not the strongest[,] voice in American science.”44
In view of this, it is paradoxical that government funding of pure research in universities 
was supported by information provided by the secretariat. The secretariat produced a compari-
son of the historical relations between science and the state in Europe and the United States 
to which Guerlac, Cohen, and Leontief (covering the Soviet Union) contributed, as well as 
statistics on the widening gap between company and university spending on research.
The report of Subcommittee 6, which was chaired by Maclaurin, argued that the “intro-
duction of a technical innovation” was only the “final stage of a highly complex chain of inter-
related activities which begin with the discovery of new scientific principles and ultimately 
lead through all the various stages of invention, development and testing, to the introduction 
of a new product, piece of machinery or process.” An example was the radio industry, a ma-
jor source of employment that had not existed as recently as 1919, which was the subject of 
Maclaurin’s own research. Innovations such as radio depended crucially on progress in pure 
science: “pure research is the pacemaker of modern technological progress.” Even after the 
“unprecedented research effort after Pearl Harbor,” the United States still fell short in “pure 
research” compared with Germany and England. However, the report also argued that “tech-
nical invention” was no longer “an individual venture” but instead was increasingly the result 
of “a coordinated research enterprise requiring the cooperation of a large number of highly 
trained workers—pure scientists, engineers, technicians and designers”—whose capital re-
quirements matched or surpassed those of industry.45 In line with Maclaurin’s prewar proposal 
on fundamental research in universities, there was no emphasis on the freedom of the (indi-
vidual) scientist; instead, there was a complex chain of planned processes in which individuals 
with different motivations and skills collaborated. Clearly Maclaurin wavered between “pure” 
research that resisted organization and fundamental research that could combine scientists 
and technicians with different interests into a team.
Based on drafts by Guerlac and others, the report of Subcommittee 1, chaired by Rabi, 
used the secretariat’s materials to argue that this complex chain started with pure research 
undertaken in European universities, compared with which American universities tradition-
ally had fallen short. On the other hand, “Yankee engineering ingenuity,” a popular expression 
in Barber and Cohen’s manuscript on American science and war, had translated the results of 
European pure science into useful products. With the collapse of science in Europe, there was 
therefore an economic need to stimulate pure science in American universities. The historical 
relations between science and the state in Europe that Guerlac had highlighted in his own 
thesis work were sidestepped, as was the larger picture that would have included the spec-
tacular growth of fundamental research in industrial research laboratories. But the conceptual 
distinction between the pure and the applied automatically classified fundamental research in 
industrial research laboratories as applied research, reaffirming the prewar idea that industry 
depended on universities for fundamental innovations. 
44 Handwritten notes, HGP 25/3/6, p. 4.
45 “Preliminary report of sub-committee #6,” HGP 25/10, pp. 3, 4, 2, 4.
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The need to support research at universities followed also from statistics on research expen-
ditures that showed the ratio of total expenditures on pure and applied research declining from 
1:5 before the war to a projected 1:7 in 1947. This widening gap was taken to support a variant 
of Gresham’s law that “applied research invariably tends to drive out pure research.” (See Fig-
ure 2.) Rather than concluding that there was no evidence for the importance of pure research 
at American universities, and that fundamental research in government and industry made up 
for this lack, the subcommittee drew the opposite conclusion: government support was needed 
because private universities could not be expected to fill the gap.46
T H E  B o w M A N  R E p o R T
A draft report prepared by the secretariat, drawing on the subcommittees’ reports, was consid-
ered by the full committee on 26–27 March. Its recommendations proved contentious, the 
meeting addressing three questions:
(1) Is substantial federal aid for scientific research necessary and desirable?
(2) Can such support and political control be effectively separated?
(3)  Is there any conceivable way to ensure flexibility in appropriation of such funds and 
do we recognize any agency now in existence as capable of administering them?47
On all three questions Rabi was pitted against those who feared that government funding 
would reduce private support for science and lead to political control of science. Other commit-
tee members spoke of “the danger of the encroaching federal octopus on the internal affairs of 
universities” and claimed that “conditions tolerated by investigators during the war . . . would 
not be tolerable in peacetime.” Rabi argued against this, using Guerlac’s review of the history of 
science in America and repeating his January statement that the majority of the scientists in his 
own laboratory would like to remain in a similar position after the war, albeit without claiming 
that research at the Radiation Laboratory was as fundamental as pure research in universities.48 
Such pragmatism did not satisfy other committee members. When Bowman raised the issue 
of government support for applied research, the quantum theory of photosensitivity (useful for 
photography) and the Servo Laboratory at MIT were cited as examples where government sup-
port for applied research would be legitimate.
When instructing the secretariat on how to write the final report, the committee finessed 
the main points of disagreement by agreeing that the report should begin with the highly quali-
fied statement, “An increased measure of federal aid for scientific research is desirable if such 
aid can be implemented without restriction of scientific freedom, having in view the desirabil-
ity of continuing private support.” They then turned to the possible establishment of a National 
Research Board; there was a long discussion, described by the minute takers as “unproductive,” 
about the merits of using the NAS to distribute funds.49
Similar divisions were revealed when attention turned to support for industrial research. 
The major disagreement concerned whether long-term research planning was compatible with 
freedom in the market. Buckley, from an industrial research laboratory, argued that it was not, 
Rabi that it was. The compromise was for the report to summarize the issues without express-
ing a clear opinion on what should be done. Similarly, it was agreed that the report would state 
that a new instrumentality “could conceivably be within the Academy” before outlining the 
46 Ibid., p. 13.
47 “Minutes of the meeting of the Bowman Committee held on March 26–7, 1945,” HGP 25/1–2, p. 1.
48 Ibid., pp. 2, 5 (quotations), 6.
49 Ibid., pp. 13, 14.
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anticipated advantages and disadvantages. The secretariat was advised to stay “vague” in the 
final wording of the instrumentality problem. Bowman conceded that “the committee had not 
completely matured its thought.” After the meeting, in a memorandum to Samuelson, Robert 
Morison did not conceal his disappointment with the outcome.50
50 Ibid., pp. 26, 27; and Robert Morison to Samuelson, 28 Mar. 1945, HGP 25/1–2.
Figure 2. Expenditures for scientific research in the United States, in U.S. dollars per 1,000 national 
income. Source: Vannevar Bush, Science—The Endless Frontier: A Report to the President (1945; 
Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1960), p. 88. The surge of expenditures on gov-
ernment research from 1940 shows research performed under the auspices of the OSRD. The 
labels “Government,” “Industry,” “Colleges and Universities,” “Research Institutes,” and “Indus-
trial Research Institutes” conceal the tripartite distinction used in the discussions within the Bow-
man Committee among “pure,” “background,” and “applied” research, in which “pure research” 
became identical with research at colleges and universities. 
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The proposal for a National Research Board was the most sensitive part of the draft report, 
for it was close to what Kilgore was proposing as well. This raised the seemingly impossible 
task of keeping sufficient distance from Kilgore’s plans without alienating him completely, a 
goal that was important because Kilgore had shown a willingness to work with Bush and the 
Bowman Committee on a newly worded initiative.51 Guerlac’s papers contain extensive notes 
on how different constituencies could be kept on board.52
A note in Guerlac’s hand, shown here as Figure 3, recapitulated the issues discussed over 
the preceding months. It listed instances of wartime experience of planning, including the U.S. 
Army Air Force test and research base at Wright Field, the NDRC, and the OSRD, concluding 
that “industry” had “genuinely converted” the “research space” and researchers themselves. 
This supported the message conveyed in propaganda movies on research spaces such as Wright 
Field, which told the public that long-term state-planned military research was crucial to win-
ning the war.53 Yet despite this, Guerlac observed that the “inside group” of scientists involved 
in the NDRC and the OSRD entertained a “philosophy of compromise and appeasement” 
vis-à-vis industry and had a “chronic fear” of a “lack of industrial cooperation.” This philosophy 
was grounded in Bush’s assessment of “the situation” and the attempt to bypass “crackpots” like 
Kilgore and others who supported his initiative. “The situation” was that the OSRD could have 
been as successful as it was only in the exceptional circumstances of the war; in peacetime it 
could not be expected that research at government institutes would be a match for fundamen-
tal research at universities or in industry. As industry could very well take care of itself, the 
reality was that universities should be supported and be enabled to capitalize on their findings 
through patents, a vision that found expression in the passing remark in the final report that 
“patents are the life of research.”54 Guerlac’s criticism went even further in notes on the way 
the word “Freedom” was abused:
Liberty and Science —
  Conant and Compton’s false hist. Ideas. — Laissez-faire
  Buckley — Misuse of word liberty {doesn’t mean “no government aid”
  Philosophy merely justifies kow-towing to industry.
He concluded that they were “Begging basic question,” “Refusing to be objective and 
scientific—prejudice—. . . .”55
A second, undated note, clearly not intended for wider distribution because of its character-
ization of Conant, Compton, and Frank B. Jewett (who was “on the extreme right”), was more 
specific in its analysis of Bush’s original intentions in forming the Bowman Committee and 
his attitude toward Kilgore: “The appointment of the committee was intended to short-circuit 
congress, to keep the proposal out of Congress and to face the Kilgore planners with a fait ac-
compli.” It discussed the issue of a “scientific high command” in even sharper terms.56 The 
tone and conclusions of this note reflect the position taken in Samuelson’s editorial in the New 
Republic, suggesting that he might have been the author.
51 Harley Kilgore to Vannevar Bush, 5 Feb. 1945; and Bush to Kilgore, 10 Feb. 1945: OSRD 2/Committee No. 3 (2-1-45 to 5-15-
45). In the end, however, Kilgore would feel double-crossed by Bush when the Bush Report was used to stall his own initiative; 
see Maddox, “Politics of World War II Science” (cit. n. 13), p. 32.
52 See esp. “A scientific high command,” undated, HGP 25/3.
53 Handwritten notes, HGP 25/3. For a pertinent propaganda film see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=thZJGVWN7f Y.
54 Bush, Science—The Endless Frontier (cit. n. 2), p. 103.
55 Handwritten notes, HGP 25/3. The remainder is hard to decipher, though the final words are “should bring matters into the 
open.”
56 “A scientific high command,” HGP 25/3/4.
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Figure 3. Guerlac’s handwritten notes. Source: HGP 25/3, p. 1. Guerlac’s rough notes provide a 
perspective on the secretariat’s thinking that was not visible in either drafts or the published version 
of the report. Following in part the list of contents of the report, they also critically comment on the 
deliberations within the Bowman Committee, as well as on the partis pris of some of its members 
or the views of those “East-coast scientists” whose opinions could not be sidestepped, such as Bush, 
Conant, and Compton. Courtesy Cornell University.
This content downloaded from 131.211.208.019 on March 18, 2017 05:38:06 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
102  Roger E. Backhouse and Harro Maas A Road Not Taken
There had been, so this note argued, a “gradual realization” even among the more conser-
vative voices (such as Jewett) that “some planning” was necessary. There was a “small number 
of scientists” who would remain in “key positions” regardless of what happened: a “close inner 
gang” of “Eastern seaboard and MIT” Republicans who were antibureaucratic and conserva-
tive but “patriotic” rather than “reactionary.” They had “stood up to business” and “slugged it 
out in the public interest during the war.” This was the background to their discussion of orga-
nizational forms.57
Owing to the sensitivity of the issue, redrafting the proposal for the creation of a National 
Science Research Board was done in close consultation with Carroll Wilson, if not with Bush 
himself.58 In this process, differences between committee members were fudged, the final 
draft promising “financial support without control” and recommending “a largely autonomous 
board” with a staff of scientists. Even though it was much weaker than Guerlac and Samuel-
son would have liked, it was too strong for much of the committee. However, the committee 
was prepared to support it when prefaced with what Bowman called a “statement of social 
philosophy.” This detailed arguments against federal control over science but stated that the 
need for federal funding was a conclusion to which the committee had been “forced.” Because 
scientific research had to be free, the board should not attempt to guide the normal growth 
processes of science in detail. In a letter to Bush, Bowman pointed out the importance of this 
part of the report: “Without these few pages on social philosophy about half of the committee 
would be unwilling to sign our report. I would be among that half.”59 The statement of social 
philosophy, added at the last minute, was much more than a preamble. 
S c i E N c E  p o l i c y ,  E c o N o M i c S ,  A N d  T H E  H i S T o R y  o f  S c i E N c E
The analysis of science policy offered a unique opportunity to forge a long-term collaboration 
between economists and historians of science aiming to understand the relations between sci-
ence, innovation, and economic progress. Months before the Bowman Committee was formed, 
Maclaurin had asked Guerlac to join his department at MIT for this purpose. Maclaurin had 
started a project on the process of innovation in which Samuelson had briefly been involved, 
and it is likely that he brought Maclaurin into contact with Guerlac when he and Guerlac 
found themselves at the Radiation Laboratory. Teaming up with Cohen and others in the 
Bowman Committee’s secretariat might have speeded up the collaboration envisioned by 
Maclaurin.
But this did not happen. In part, the reasons for this road not taken can be found in fault 
lines within the Bowman Committee and its secretariat, especially between Guerlac and Sam-
uelson on one hand and Cohen and, increasingly, Maclaurin on the other. These fault lines 
became even more apparent after the war. We have seen that Guerlac and Samuelson came 
to a shared understanding of science and of the need for postwar federal funding of science. 
They considered the functioning of the OSRD as the new “upper bound” on how scientists 
working in collaboration on planned research projects could produce useful outcomes, not 
only for the military but also as spin-offs to industry at large. This did not mean that they were 
in favor of political control of science, but it led them to downplay the emphasis on the un-
constrained freedom of the scientist. This position was originally shared by Maclaurin: in his 
proposal to investigate research spending on universities he noted that it was all to the good that 
57 Ibid.
58 “Recommendations of Bowman Committee,” OSRD 2/Committee No. 3 (2-1-45 to 5-15-45). See also “Bowman Committee: 
Basic Recommendations,” ibid., p. 7; and “Draft prologue,” ibid., p. 7.
59 Isaiah Bowman to Bush, 11 Apr. 1945, OSRD 2/Committee No. 3 (1 of 3).
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scarce resources had forced university scientists to pay closer attention to practical applications. 
Within the Bowman Committee only Rabi shared this view, emphasizing repeatedly that the 
fact that members of the staff at the Radiation Laboratory were asked to work on set problems 
did not mean that their modes of proceeding were prescribed as well. The problem of planned 
research was no different from that of a research institute with a professor and an assemblage 
of scientists working on a predefined problem, and there was no reason to be dismissive about 
federal institutes’ capacity to produce efficient outcomes compared with universities. 
However, this was not the message of the Bowman Report, which emphasized the impor-
tance of private research universities and the freedom of individual scientists to pursue their 
own research agendas. The idea that the progress of science crucially depended on the com-
plete freedom of the scientist, endowed with sufficient means to follow his intuitions, had 
been consistently pushed by Conant under the banner of the scientist’s need for freedom in a 
democratic society and would find its way into his Understanding Science, the published ver-
sion of his Terry Lectures at Yale University, in which he thanked Cohen for preparing the case 
studies. It could equally be found in Cohen’s own Science: Servant of Man and in the manu-
script on American science and war he had previously been working on with Barber. Choos-
ing his examples from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Conant laid out a scheme 
for “general education” in science that would use historical cases to develop the “tactics and 
strategies” followed by some of the geniuses of experimental inquiry. For reasons of simplicity, 
these case studies (the air-pump, phlogiston, and electricity), which brilliantly tackled issues 
that still resonate today—such as the structuring role of conceptual schemes, science as a social 
endeavor, and the larger sociopolitical context—were chosen from a period in which “pure” 
research was performed in newly established learned societies and in the private sphere, rather 
than at universities. However, the nub of his argument was that the “tactics and strategies” of 
early modern scientists could be seamlessly applied to twentieth-century science, despite the 
development of large-scale industrial laboratories and planned science under the OSRD, to 
which Guerlac and Samuelson attached such importance and in which Conant himself had 
played no minor role. Separating these “tactics and strategies” from the larger socioeconomic 
context, Conant went on to argue that the inclusion of materials drawn from the “political, so-
cial, and cultural” context was “quite irrelevant” to the general principles underlying scientific 
progress. These general principles concentrated on the conceptual choices made by individual 
scientists who were left free to pursue their intuitions without a view to practical results. Com-
menting on J. L. Henderson’s quip that the steam engine had done more for science than sci-
ence for the steam engine, Conant argued that “very little could be learned” about the “Tactics 
and Strategies” of science from studying advances such as the steam engine, “because they 
do not belong to science.”60 In his primer Cohen confronted head-on the charge that socio-
economic changes had changed the landscape of science; he sought to isolate the individual 
scientist and his conceptual struggles as the premier subject of the historian of science. Science 
became defined as pure science, to which the study of socioeconomic history and the history of 
technological change would not add anything substantial.
Maclaurin’s analysis of the process of innovation followed on from this view of scientific 
progress. In his 1949 book on innovation in the radio industry, a book that was enthusiasti-
cally endorsed by Compton, Maclaurin detailed how the original and unplanned discoveries 
of scientists such as Faraday and Maxwell had been translated into marketable products via 
entrepreneur-inventors like Marconi. In his foreword Compton emphasized Maclaurin’s care 
60 James Bryant Conant, On Understanding Science: An Historical Approach (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1947), 
pp. 108, 23. On the case studies see Hamlin, “Pedagogical Roots of the History of Science” (cit. n. 11).
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in pointing out “the important distinction between advances in fundamental science and their 
practical applications in new or improved products.” His great contribution was to draw a clear 
distinction between “the scientist, the inventor, and the business innovator,” which was of “ma-
jor significance to an understanding of the process of technological change.”61
Science—The Endless Frontier was prominent in the book. Maclaurin placed a quotation 
from Bush about the importance of “pure research” at the beginning of the preface, and Comp-
ton cited Maclaurin’s experience with the Bush Report as his reason for encouraging Maclaurin 
to engage in his studies. This was, of course, misleading, because those studies had begun 
three years earlier. Compton had consistently attached importance to the relation between 
fundamental research, industrial innovation, and economic progress and had hoped that Mac-
laurin, taking advantage of his proximity to MIT’s engineers, would investigate these relations 
in detail. Maclaurin’s book met Compton’s expectations. It traced the development of the ra-
dio industry from its roots in pure research, via the work of inventors and innovators (whom he 
carefully distinguished), to commercial applications that would have surprised even Faraday. 
In retrospect Cohen remembered that at the time most scientists considered this process, now 
known as the linear model of innovation, as “axiomatic.”62 But as with any axiom, it was the 
outcome of choices. Within the secretariat it had even been described as Conant and Comp-
ton’s “false” history of ideas, catering to corporate America and misrepresenting the history of 
scientific progress. These choices made economic history and the history of technology an add-
on to the history of science and fixed the primacy of the university as the site for pure research 
and the necessary starting point in the process of innovation.
C o dA
The widely held view that the Bowman Committee was of one mind in its attitude toward the 
postwar organization of science is not correct. Though there was unanimity on the importance 
of support for basic research, there were deep divisions over the role to be taken by the state, 
and the secretariat played an important part in drafting a report that would be acceptable to all 
members of the committee, supporting those members, such as Rabi, who favored planned sci-
ence. The Bowman Committee’s distinction between pure, applied, and background research 
was part of its attempt to pick out the university as the premier site for fundamental research 
and to secure the freedom of university scientists to follow their own research agendas, a con-
clusion that was supported by historical and statistical materials produced by the secretariat. 
This conclusion was premised on the idea that new discoveries in science would, somehow, 
translate into new industries. Though vague on details, the committee agreed that support 
for pure research should rest in the hands of scientists, minimizing government control. The 
reactions to the draft report at the 25–26 March meeting, where many committee members 
expressed their fears of federal control, show that the report’s recommendations were not a 
foregone conclusion. Samuelson’s view was that they had achieved as much as they could 
have hoped for in the final document: despite the finessing of key problems, the report made 
a case for federal funding of science that was more than the majority of committee members 
would have accepted without Bowman’s carefully worded statement of social philosophy. Yet 
despite this success, the basis for any future collaboration between economists and historians 
of science was slipping away. 
Maclaurin, who continued to study technical change and the relation between scientific 
progress and innovation, became a spokesman for the consensus position of the Bowman 
61 Rupert Maclaurin, Invention and Innovation in the Radio Industry (New York: Macmillan, 1949), pp. ix, xi.
62 Cole et al., Science—The Endless Frontier, 1945–1995: Learning from the Past, Designing for the Future (cit. n. 36).
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Committee. In a short article in the Harvard Business Review, a venue directed at the audience 
Bush, Conant, and Compton had been most anxious to keep on board, he took up Bush’s 
request to spread the report’s message. He argued that although Langmuir’s Nobel Prize–
winning research with GE and Land’s research at Polaroid had bridged “the gap between 
fundamental research and its practical applications in industry,” this was “impractical” for 
“industry generally.” He used the example of Faraday (soon to be displaced by more recent 
examples of radar, penicillin, and the atomic bomb) to show how unlikely it was that scientists 
could interest “stockholders and investors” in his kind of research.63 This almost dictated the 
conclusion that the government had to step in to support research at universities, rather than 
elsewhere. He failed to draw the opposite conclusion: that the new conditions for fundamental 
research had changed with the emergence of large-scale industrial laboratories in which the 
distinction between the pure and the applied or between science and technology made little 
sense to begin with.64
Guerlac had no wish to become the “historian of modern science and industry” that Mac-
laurin wanted him to be. The history of nineteenth-century science could quite unjustifiably 
give the impression of science’s peaceful progress and of scientists who were completely free to 
pursue their own curiosity. But this image of the scientist, cherished and carefully nurtured by 
Conant and Cohen, was modeled on the humanist scholar, on the ideal of a universal broth-
erhood of independent minds, rather than on the experimentalist, who increasingly worked 
under conditions not so different from the modern factory research laboratory; their model was 
closer to the Harvard scholar than the MIT engineer. His thesis work and his work as the of-
ficial historian of the Radiation Laboratory had shown Guerlac the intricate relations between 
science, war, and the state and had demonstrated that scientists could voluntarily engage in 
long-term collaborative and planned projects—a view that was shared by Rabi. 
Guerlac therefore had strong personal and intellectual reasons for preferring to accept Cor-
nell’s offer to establish a program in the history of science rather than Maclaurin’s invitation 
to move to MIT, and George Sarton warned him that “at the MIT” he would always be “an 
outsider among technicians, somewhat like a professor of English in a conservatory of music.”65 
His appetite for such collaboration must have been further diminished when he saw the direc-
tion Maclaurin’s ideas were taking. His opposition to a 1957 proposal to bring the history of 
technology within the history of science may well have been motivated by his resistance to the 
then-common distinction between the scientist and the engineer and the alleged neutrality 
of scientific and engineering knowledge.66 Cohen remained at Harvard, physically close to 
Samuelson and Maclaurin, but he saw no need for the history of science to be informed by 
economic history.
Samuelson committed himself to MIT, which was not only a congenial environment free 
of Harvard’s anti-Semitism but also a place where economics could be developed as a science 
that favored mathematical modeling over the institutional, historical approach that Maclaurin 
63 W. Rupert Maclaurin, “Federal Support for Scientific Research,” Harvard Business Review, Spring 1947, pp. 385–396.
64 See esp. Leonard S. Reich, The Making of American Industrial Research: Science and Business at GE and Bell, 1876–1926 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002); and George Wise, Willis R. Whitney, General Electric, and the Origins of U.S. 
Industrial Research (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1985).
65 Michael Aaron Dennis, “Echoes of the Past: Henry Guerlac and Radar’s Historiographic Problem,” in Tracking the History of 
Radar, ed. Oskar Blumtritt (Piscataway, N.J.: IEEE, 1994), pp. 285–298, on p. 294 (quoting Sarton).
66 See Jennifer Karns Alexander, “Thinking Again about Science in Technology,” Isis, 2012, 103:518–526, esp. p. 523. Alexander 
does not elaborate on the reasons for Guerlac’s opposition, which prima facie does not square with his own work on the French 
school of engineering and his work on the Radiation Laboratory. On Cohen’s position see also Hamlin, “Pedagogical Roots of 
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This content downloaded from 131.211.208.019 on March 18, 2017 05:38:06 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
106  Roger E. Backhouse and Harro Maas A Road Not Taken
had learned from Schumpeter at the Harvard Business School. Samuelson did not become an 
advocate of the linear model, but the mathematical models developed at MIT mostly black-
boxed science and technology, leading to a similar outcome. There is an irony in that although 
he had sided with Guerlac, Rabi, and the advocates of planned science, Samuelson’s career 
prospered because Compton’s successor as president of MIT, James Rhyne Killian, followed 
Conant’s first rule for enabling science to flourish, warmly recommended by Cohen in his own 
primer in the history of science: “There is only one proved method of assisting the advance-
ment of pure science—that of picking men of genius, backing them heavily, and leaving them 
to direct themselves.”67
67 Cohen, Science: Servant of Man (cit. n. 26), p. 307 (quoting Conant).
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